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THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974:
A STUDY IN CONFLICTS
Peter F. Flaherty*
INTRODUCTION
It is no exaggeration to state that there are hundreds of millions of pages
of federal government records which contain personal information about great
numbers of American citizens. These records - far more than the government
needs or can effectively use - very often include information which is completely
innocuous by any rational standard. However, in many instances the material
in these records document the most intimate and personal details of an
individual's life. This information is of the sort that can literally destroy
careers, reputations and lives.
The abuses in the collection of this material have now been welldocumented, 1 and the present administration has begun to examine the ways
in which such abuses can be avoided in the future. 2 In addition to the abuses
that have occurred with regard to the collection of information, troubling
questions arise in defining the proper use for the material already acquired
and in formulating a policy to regulate the public's access to this information.
The decisions in these areas must involve the accomodation of two of
contemporary America's shibboleths: openness in government and protection of
personal privacy. The dilemma faced by government officials is that these two
concepts often pull in exactly opposite directions. When government opens its
internal processes to the public, it might, by this same action, be revealing
information which invades the personal privacy of one member of this public.
Consequently, government's responsibility is to seek a compromise. The task,
as explained by then-Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, who was the
Senate's floor manager for privacy legislation, is to strike an acceptable
balance between the public's right to know about the conduct of their
government and their equally important right to have information which is

*Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. Partner - Berkham, Ruslander, Pohl, Lieber & Engel, Pittsburgh. Deputy
Attorney General of the United States, 1977-1978. Member of the Pennsylvania, Michigan and Florida
Bars. J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School, 1951; M.P.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1968.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Richard M. Rogers and Abbe David Lowell of the
Department of Justice for their assistance in connection with this article.
Editor's Note: Mr. Flaherty was Deputy Attorney General of the United States when he wrote this
article.
1.

2.

Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society
(1977); cf. Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 971

(May-June 1975) [hereinafter referred to as Michigan Project].
The Department of Justice, for example, has organized a task force composed of representatives from
throughout the department to present to the Attorney General a comprehensive position paper on
restricting the collection of information, regulating the retention of this material and providing the
public access to government records.
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personal to them maintained with the greatest degree of confidence by Federal
3
agencies.

In the area of access to government records, the tools which federal agencies
now have to strike this necessary balance are the Freedom of Information
Act 4 (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of 19745 (Privacy Act). Unfortunately,
however, these two statutes, rather than embodying the compromise that
Congress sought to achieve, 6 instead reflect the tug-of-war that exists between
openness and privacy. Unless their opposite pulls are accommodated, a proper
balance can never be achieved.
This article identifies some of the apparent contradictions which exist
between these two statutes, points out some of the administrative problems
these differences have caused, explains how the Department of Justice has
resolved these problems and offers some suggestions for the future.
THE CLASH BETWEEN THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS
Differing Underlying Policies
One does not have to go beyond their underlying purposes and policies to
see the conflict which exists between the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
The guiding principle of the FOIA is that the interests of the American
public are best served by maximum disclosure of government records. In the
1955 letter first authorizing a Congressional subcommittee to formulate freedom
of information legislation, this policy was stated:
An informed public makes the difference between mob rule and democratic
government. If the pertinent and necessary information on government activities
is denied the public, the result is a weakening of the democratic process and
the ultimate atrophy of our form of government. 7

The Privacy Act, however, is the result of different concerns. Its legislative
history8 is replete with statements which describe privacy 9 as the fundamental
3.

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act, 120 Cong. Rec.
S. 21,817 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974). This task is not simple. In his address to the Federal Bar
Association Conference, Douglas W. Metz explained how difficult this process can be:
Our challenge remains, therefore, the hard one of striking a fair balance between competing
interests. And the thoughtful public servant rarely has the luxury of balancing good and evil.
Most often the competing interests confronting him are one good versus another good.
Michigan Project, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 971 (May-June 1975).
After its origitial passage in 1966 as the Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, the
Freedom of Information Act underwent many changes. See generally Note, The, Freedom of
Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 Syracuse L. Rev. 951 (1975). The act is
presently codified as 5 U.S.C. §552 (Supp. 1976).
5 U.S.C. §552a (Supp. 1976).
In order to assure that some privacy legislation was enacted, consideration of the two bills in the
conference process was expedited. This speed may be responsible for the inconsistencies that this article
adresses. For a discussion of the compromise process, see Senator Ervin's remarks, 120 Cong. Rec.
S. 21,810 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
'Letter from Rep. William L. Dawson, Chairman, Government Operations Committee, to Rep. John
E. Moss, Chairman, Subcommittee on Access to Government Records, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 6268 (93rd Cong., 2d Sess.).
The entire legislative history of the Privacy Act has been compiled by the House and Senate Committtees
on Government Operations. Joint Committee Report, Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974,
S. 3148 (Public Law 93-579) (Sept. 1976).
One significant difficulty with both the FOIA and the Privacy Act is their failure to define the term
"privacy." The two statutes seem to assume that the term is self-defining. An adequate definition of
the term has, however, not emerged in the law that has developed. See generally W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts §117 (4th ed. 1971); Michigan Project, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 1231-42
(1975); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). As a consequence of the statutes' silence, it is
difficult to ascertain what "privacy interest" is supposed to be weighed against the release of any
particular document.
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concept in American democracy. For example, as part of his remarks in support
of privacy legislation, Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine declared:
Of all the rights of citizens, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves
not merely protection from personal assault, but exemption of his private
affairs, books and papers from the scrutiny of others.lO
A policy seeking to protect a person's affairs from the "scrutiny of others"
is a policy which pulls in the opposite direction of maximum disclosure.
Conflicting Frameworks and Provisions in the Statutes
The general frameworks of the two acts mirror their underlying concerns.
From its very first sentence to its last, the FOLA promotes maximum disclosure.
The statute, which draws no facial distinction between the request of a person
seeking his own records and one seeking the records of another, 1 opens by
stating that "[elach agency shall make available to the public" 12 the
information which is then described in detail. The thrust of the act is entirely
affirmative - towards disclosure.
. An individual's right of privacy is recognized in the FOIA by two of its
nine exemptions to the release of records, 13 but this protection of privacy is
made subordinate to the overall policy of disclosure. First, whatever protection given by the FOTA is given in a narrowly drawn, narrowly interpreted 14 exception to its
genernal design of releasing records. Second, only
"clearly unwarranted" 15 invasions of personal privacy are prohibited. Consequently,
the FOIA recognizes and approves of numerous invasions of privacy as long
as there is a strong enough policy to justify them. 16 Third, as with all of the
exceptions, withholding information for privacy reasons is to be determined on
a document-by-document basis. The FOIA does not authorize the exemption

10.
11.

120 Cong. Rec. S. 19,828 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (emphasis added).
Section (a)(3) of the FOIA states in part that " . . . each agency, upon any request for records . . . shall
make the records promptly available to any person." 5 U.S.C. §552 (a)(3). (Supp. 1976) (emphasis
added).
12. 5 U.S.C. §552 (a) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
13. Subsection (b)(6) states that the disclosure requirements of the FOIA do not apply to "personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. §552 (b)(6) (Supp. 1976). Subsection (b)(7)(C) of the act provides
an exception to disclosure to those "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes"
which, if released, would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C)
(Supp. 1976). The omission in (b)(7)(C) of the word "clearly" was intentional; its purpose and effect
is to make the government's burden for withholding information somewhat lighter in the investigatory
records context than it is when (b)(6) is used. 120 Cong. Rec. H. 10003 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974).
Consequently, when this article speaks of the "privacy exception" in the FOIA, it is referring to
(b)(6), since anything that would be withheld under this exception, with its higher burden, would be
exempt from from disclosure under (b)(7)(C). See U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General's
Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments of the Freedom of Information Act, at 9 (Feb. 1975). Of
course, in order for (b)(7)(C) to 'be applicable, the information in question must be the subject of
investigatory files. All but a very few requests sent to the Department of Justice concern such files.
14. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d
166 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
15. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (Supp.. 1976). The lesser standard of "unwarranted" is contained in the exception
(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA. See note 13 supra.
16. If a release of information would constitute an invasion of privacy, the foreseeable harm must be
balanced against the benefits that would accrue to the public. See Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v.
Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318, 1320-21 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). The policies of exposing election fraud and
revealing more of the story of Watergate prompted one court to order the release of information that
would reveal possible illegal campaign contributions by named individuals. The invasion of their privacy
was deemed to be subordinate to the benefits of release. Congressional News Syndicate v. Department
of Justice, No. 77-882 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1977).

19781

Freedom of Information and the Right to Privacy

29

from release of an entire system of records because they are generally of the
type that invade personal privacy (or cause another type of harm recognized
by the FOIA's other exemptions). 17 Finally, even if some material on a specific
document falls into one of the act's exemptions and cannot be disclosed, it is
to be deleted and "any reasonably segregable portion of [the] record is still
to be released." 18
The Privacy Act is set up quite differently. It divides the requests of
individuals for their own records from those which seek information about
others. 19 While the act seems to provide liberal access to the former category
of records, 20 it very clearly seeks to limit access to the latter. When a request
for a record is not made by the subject of that record, or is made without
that subject's consent, the Privacy Act states that "[n]o agency shall disclose
any record" unless one of 11 exceptions to non-disclosure is met.2 1 Consequently,
while the FOIA is in the affirmative, the Privacy Act is written in the negative.
Further restrictions on disclosure are provided by the exemptions relating
to record systems contained in the Privacy Act. 22 Even if it meets one of the
11 exceptions for disclosure, a document may be withheld if it is part of a
system of records for which the agency involved has promulgated a blanket
exemption from disclosure. Its legislative history demonstrated that the drafters
of the Privacy Act saw unchecked disclosure of government records as a threat
to the personal privacy of citizens. It is clear that the Privacy Act was designed
to restrict that flow of information.
The pull between disclosure and privacy in these two statutes can be further
demonstrated by reference to their procedural provisions. 23 The FOIA, for
example, provides that all requests must be processed within 10 days. 24. A
related provision states that a requester does not have to exhaust his administrative remedies, generally a requirement before an agency's action can be

17.

18.
19.

20.

21.
22.

23.

24.

The exceptions in the FOIA represent the areas in which Congress has determined that valid reasons
may exist for withholding records which would outweigh the benefits that would follow their release.
Congress has, for example, decided that, in addition to privacy protection, the advantages of disclosure
may be outweighed by other competing interests such as commerical confidentiality, 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4)
(Supp. 1976), and by the need of an agency to protect its internal processes, 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(2),
(5) and (8) (Supp. 1976).
5 U.S.C. §552(b) (Supp. 1976).
The disclosure section of the Privacy Act states:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means
of communication to any person . . . except pursuant to a written request by . . . the individual
to whom the record pertains . . .
5 U.S.C. §552a(b) (Supp. 1976).
The preamble, statement of purpose and section on disclosure of the Privacy Act all state that an
individual is to be given access to his own records. 5 U.S.C. §552a (Supp. 1976); see note 19
supra. Other sections of the act, however, work in the opposite direction and restrict the information
that can be given to an individual to a far greater degree than does the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. §552a(j),(k)
(Supp. 1976). See text accompanying notes 29-32 injra.
5 U.S.C. §552a(b) (Supp. 1976).
Expressing different concerns (e.g., a system maintained by the CIA and a system of investigatory
records in a law enforcement agency), both sections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act allow "[tlhe head
of an agency [to] promulgate rules . . . which exempt any system of records within the agency from
any part of" the act's disclosure requirements. 5 U.S.C. §552a(j),(k) (Supp. 1976).
The provisions chosen are those which can most easily be shown to affect the balance betweenopenness
and privacy. There are certainly other procedural differences between these two acts. For example,
while the FOIA contains an elaborate scheme for administrative appeals, 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(6)(A)(i)
(Supp. 1976), the Privacy Act has none. In addition, the Privacy Act provides for a two-year statute
of limitations, 5 U.S.C. §552a(g)(5) (Supp. 1976), but the FOIA has no internal statute of limitations.
5 U.S.C. §552(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp. 1976).
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appealed,2 5 if an agency fails to process a request within the time periods
provided and act upon an appeal taken. 26 The effect of these two parts of the
FOIA is to prevent administrative delays from becoming the means by which
information is denied.
The Privacy Act, however, does not have any similar provisions. Presumably,
the effect of the act's silence is that the regular procedural rules of administrative
law would apply to requests made under the Privacy Act. Such rules provide
for exhaustion of remedies, with the result that processing of requests for
27
government records could be delayed considerably.
THE APPLICATION OF TWO CONFLICTING STATUTES:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Because of the divergent directions in which these two statutes pull, an
agency, forced to decide which law to apply in a particular situation, is
presented with a significant problem. Since the. Privacy Act generally favors
restricting the flow of personal information,, and the FOIA generally favors
disclosure, choosing which is applicable to a particular request is more than
a procedural question; the choice can determine which of the countervailing
policies - openness or privacy - will prevail.
Requesting One's Own Records
When an individual is seeking access to his own records (a first-party
request), it would appear that the Privacy Act should apply. It was passed
more recently than the FOIA, and contains one set of rules for first-party
requests: (favoring disclosure) and another set of rules - applying more stringent
standards - for. third-party requests. 28 The Privacy Act, therefore, could be
read to amend the FOIA, at least with regard to disclosures to first-party
requesters. It would be anomolous, however, to allow the Privacy Act alone
to govern first-party requests. If it did, a first-party requester, who obviously
does not need privacy protection against the release to him of his own
records, 29 might be denied his files because of the restrictions in an act designed
25.
26.

See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938)
exhaustion is a longstanding rule of judicial administration).
5 U.S.C. §552(a)(6) (C) (Supp. 1976).

(the requirement of

27. The absence of time limits in the Privacy.Act has not had a significant impact within the Department
of Justice because of the administrative backlog which affects all requests. This backlog - caused by
the miscalculation by the drafters of the number of requests that would be made, and by the
unreasonableness of the ten-day processing period - whether from individuals seeking their. own records
or those of others, whether labelled FOIA or Privacy Act - chronologically from the date of receipt.
No preference is given to the FOIA requests because the time limits in that statute cannot be met.
See Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explains
history of the administrative backlog and the practice being followed by the Department of Justice).
The Department of Justice is now engaged in an effort to have each of its components "current" by
January 1, 1978, or as soon thereafter as possible. When this occurs, it is the intent of the department
to continue treating FOIA and Privacy Act requests in the same way. It is the department's position,
however, that the ten-day period prescribed by the FOIA will never be met. Many of those suggesting
changes in the law have agreed with the Justice Department's position that 30 days is a more reasonable
28.
29.

and attainable period. See: Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in
an Information Society, ch. 13 (1977).
See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
Some privacy concerns, however, do arise in the area of first-party requests. It is quite common for
a person to be only one of a number of subjects in a multi-subject file. In such circumstances, if a
background investigation conducted for a federal job applicant reveals that a relative has an arrest
record, or that a requester's spouse is having an extra-marital affair, the privacy interests of those
individuals merit consideration.
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to protect personal privacy. As previously stated, the Privacy Act, as part of
its protective scheme, allows an agency to exempt from disclosure entire record
systems. 30 Should a document fall into one of these systems, a first-party
request could be denied. If, on the other hand, the same request were processed
under the FOIA - which allows an agency to withhold information only on
a document-by-document basis and even then provides for the release of portions
of pertinent documents 3 1 - the same information might, be released.
It does not seem likely that Congress wanted the restrictive design of the
Privacy Act to be used to deny an individual records about himself which he
could have obtained through the FOIA. The major reason for the Privacy
Act's restrictions is to protect personal privacy, but it has already been shown
that a first-party requester does not need that protection.
Conversely, it does not seem likely that Congress, which had painstakingly
drawn the narrow-exemption approach in the FOIA; wanted it repealed, at
least with respect to first-party requests, by the Privacy Act. The benefits
which flow from openness and maximum disclosure are as great when an
individual requests his own records as when he requests the files of another.
Finally, -it does not appear that Congress would have wanted the first-party
requester to lose the advantages of administrative procedures and time limits
proceed through the Privacy Act, which has none
in the FOIA by having him
32
of these same provisions.
One of the principles of statutory construction is that every effort should
be made to reconcile apparently contradictory statutes. 33 In order to accomplish
this, the Department of Justice formulated regulations which, with respect to
first-party requests, combine the provisions of the two acts. 34 According to
these regulations, the department follows the -intent of the Privacy Act by
making it the exclusive vehicle for individuals to gain access to records about
themselves.
The department then gives the first-party requester the same information
as would be made available to him under the FOIA. This is accomplished by

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1973); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188,
198 (1939).
These regulations provide:
(a) Issuance of this section and actions considered or taken pursuant hereto are not to be
deemed a waiver of the Government's position that the materials in question are subject to all of the
exemptions contained in the Privacy Act. By providing for exemptions in the Act, Congress conferred
upon each agency the option, at the discretion of the agency, to grant or deny access to exempt
materials unless prohibited from doing so by any other provision of law. Releases of records under
this section, beyond those mandated by the Privacy Act, are at the sole discretion of the Deputy
Attorney General and of those persons to whom authority hereunder may be delegated. Authority to
effect such discretionary releases of records and to deny requests for those records as an initial matter
is hereby delegated to the appropriate system managers as per the Notices of Systems of Records
published in 40 FEDERAL REGISTER 167, pages 38703-38801 (August 27, 1975).
(b) Any request by an individual for information pertaining to himself shall be processed solely
pursuant to this Subpart D. To the extent that the individual seeks access to records from systems
of records which have been exempted from the provisions of the Privacy Act, the individual shall
receive in addition to access to those records he is entitled to receive under the Privacy Act and as
a matter of discretion as set forth in paragraph (a) of this section, access to all records within the
scope of his request to which he would have been entitled under the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. 552, but ,for the enactment of the Privacy Act and the exemption of the pertinent systems of
records pursuant thereto . . . . 28 C.F.R. §16.57 (1976).
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making that material, which is covered by the blanket exemptions of the
Privacy Act but which would not be withheld under the narrower approach
of the FOIA, the subject of a discretionary release. To bring the statutes
further into harmony, the department applies the same procedures for handling
and the same time framework to both FOIA and Privacy Act requests.
are not penalized by
Consequently, individuals requesting their own records
35
the procedural differences between the two acts.
Seeking the Records of Others
. The differences between the FOIA and Privacy Act might have caused
the most difficulty in the processing of a request of an individual for the
records of another (a third-party request). On the one hand, the FOIA would
release any portion of any of these records which did not constitute a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 36 The Privacy Act, however, was
to be designed so that any release of a record without the consent of the
subject of that record would constitute a prohibited invasion of privacy without
regard to any countervailing reason justifying its disclosure. The difficulty that
this conflict could have produced was partially avoided.
Through a series of compromises, 37 Congress resolved this conflict when,
as one of the exceptions to the non-disclosure scheme of the Privacy Act, it
provided that information would be released if its disclosure was required by
the FOIA. 38 This arrangement seems odd because it leaves protection of personal
privacy to a statute which is concerned with maximum disclosure and which,
as previously stated, generally gives privacy a subordinate role. Nevertheless,
39
this is the result that Congress intended.
This provision of the Privacy Act which incorporates part of the FOIA,
however, does not resolve all of an agency's difficulties in processing third-party
requests. Since the provision is just one intersection between two otherwise
parallel lines, it is difficult to imagine that all of the concerns for protecting
privacy which had inspired the Privacy Act were to be read out of the act

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

See note 27 supra.
See note 13 supra.
See note 6 supra.
Section (b) of the Privacy Act provides:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained [in its systems), except pursuant to a
written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individuali to whom the record
pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be . . . (2) required under Section 552 of
this title; 5 U.S.C. §552a (b)(2) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
The FOIA exemption in the Privacy Act was the result of a compromise between the House and
Senate. The original House bill contained no reference whatsoever to the FOIA. H. 16373, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), 120 Cong. Rec. H. 10,894 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974). The committee report which
accompanied the bill explained that it was the intent of this omission to alter the privacy exception
contained in the FOIA by substituting for the "clearly unwarranted" test a standard that would be
far more restrictive. H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974). In effect, the Privacy Act

would have become a statute which specifically exempted all retrievable personal information, and
would have been made applicable to FOIA requests through exemption (b)(3), 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(3)
(Supp. 1976). The Senate's version of the Privacy Act contained an FOIA disclosure exemption. 120
Cong. Rec. S19,829 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (detailing the provisions of the Senate's bill, S.3418).
The Senate prevailed in the compromise process, and a memorandum placed in the Congressional
Record which describes the compromise states that "[tihis compromise is designed to preserve the
status quo as interpreted by courts regarding the disclosure of personal information under the FOIA's
privacy exemption." Anaylsis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy
Act, 120 Cong. Rec. S. 21,817 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1974).
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because of a single reference to the FOIA. If this were the desired result,
what purposes would be served by the other provisions in the Privacy Act?
If, for example, reference to the FOIA was intended to be determinitive of
every issue, the Privacy Act's careful distinction between first-party and
third-party requests would give way to the absence of any differentiation in
the FOIA. 40
The Department of Justice has rejected an interpretation that would totally
emasculate the Privacy Act. One important aspect of the department's approach
is that it does not treat first-party requests *and third-party requests in the
same way. This position can be supported logically and textually. First, it has
already ,been stated that the privacy of an individual is not usually invaded
by releasing to him a document about himself, 41 but the release of the same
document to a third person might very well constitute an invasion of the first
individual's privacy. Second, the Privacy Act unmistakably distinguishes between
first-party and third-party requests. 42 Therefore, in the department's interpretation, when the Privacy Act's standard for disclosure is incorporated into
the FOIA, the distinction the former makes between the kinds of requests is
left intact, is combined with the FOIA's privacy exemption, and becomes a
factor to be considered in deciding whether release of a document will constitute
"a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." In other words, the
FOIA's general framework of exceptions from disclosure is used, but the
FOIA's specific exemptions 43 for privacy are reinforced to express the Privacy
Act's greater concerns in this area. Consequently, a document will not automatically be released to a third party just because it has been or could have
been released under. the FOIA to the person it concerned. Despite some
decisions to the contrary, 44 and articles suggesting other interpretations, 45 it is
the Justice Department's practice in processing these third-party requests to
consider the identity of the particular requester.
Numerous variations exist when the identity of a requester is considered.
The first possibility is that a person who seeks information about another
offers no information regarding his relationship with the subject of his request.
In this context, the practice of the Department of Justice - resulting from
the Privacy Act's greater concern for protecting an individual's privacy - is
to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any .records about the subject.
The requester who lacks the consent of a record subject is informed that
an admission of the existence of records would in itself constitute a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Despite the revelations in recent
years which show how investigatory records are compiled and explain how
innocent they might be, there is still a stigma that can attach to an individual
when it is revealed that he is the subject of law enforcement records.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See note II and accompanying text supra.
See note 29 supra.
See notes 19 and 28 and accompanying text supra.
See note 13 supra.
See, e.g., Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 790 n.
3 (6th Cir. 1972). But see Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 (D. C. Cir. 1971).
See, e.g., Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy Act of
1974, 11 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 596 (1976); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A
Seven-Year Assessment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 895 (1974); Note, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom
of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527 (1972).
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On the other extreme is the case where a requester has obtained the
consent of the subject whose records are being sought. In this instance, the
what
policy of the Justice Department is to provide the requester precisely
46
the subject would have received had he made the request himself.
Between these two extremes, the variations are infinite. These are the
situations in which applying the "clearly unwarranted" standard is most difficult,
as no guidelines or tests are provided by either the acts themselves or their
legislative histories. 47 This is the area that has provoked the most controversy
in the courts and in legal journals. Some of the questions which influence
disclosure decisions in this vast area and which are the subject of this controversy
are: whether the intended use of a requester can be considered; whether the
possibility of further publication after an initial release can affect the original
disclosure decision; whether a person's status as a public official or public
figure destroys his privacy interest with regard to freedom of information, and
what kinds of public concern - measured by what devices - can outweigh
invasions of personal privacy.
Each agency resolves these questions differently. Because of this, some
have suggested that a more concrete definition of the test to be used in
determining whether a release would constitute an invasion of privacy be placed
in the applicable statutes. Before this is done, however, an in-depth study of
present practices and procedures should be undertaken. Such a study may
actually find that, in their implementation of the FOIA and the Privacy Act,
various federal agencies have struck a fair balance between openness and
privacy.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the FOIA and the Privacy Act were passed, there have been
suggestions that they be amended. Some have claimed that they were not
protective enough of a person's privacy; others have claimed that they did not
provide enough access to government records; still others have sought their
repeal because they have crippled the ability of federal agencies to operate.
The Privacy Act of 1974 established the Privacy Protection Study Commission
to assess the effects of the act and to conduct a general study into the areas
of personal privacy and access to government records. In July, 1977, the
48 which are now being examined by all
commission published its findings,
49
government.
branches of the
The Privacy Protection Study Commission's report, and the analysis and
debate which the commission has stimulated, has already resulted in the
introduction of legislation to modify the FOIA and the Privacy Act. 50 While
such legislation may attempt' to reconcile the apparent contradictions and
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But see note 29 supra.
For a discussion of what little guidance is provided by the legislative history, see 11 Harv. Civ. Rts.
- Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 596, 598-600 (1974).
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As previously stated, see note 2 supra, the Justice Department's task force on privacy has made the
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50. See, e.g., H. R. 10076, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (an omnibus bill which includes revision of the
Privacy Act of 1974).
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inconsistencies which exist between the two statutes, complete reconciliation
may not be possible given the elusiveness of a precise definition for the term
"privacy" and the difficulty of articulating in broad, prospective terms a proper
balance between personal privacy and maximum disclosure. There may not be
a single standard, a single test of whether a release would constitute a "clearly
unwarranted invasion" of privacy, that can apply to all agencies at all times.
A case-by-case study of the decisions each agency has made under the
existing legislation would probably reveal that, despite the absence of guidelines
in the texts of the two statutes, a fair compromise has been achieved in their
implementation. If this is the case, Congress may decide that there is no
substitute in this complex and sensitive area for the good faith application of
common sense.
Legislation may be necessary, however, to bring the general frameworks
and the procedures of the two acts into harmony. The enactment of two
different statutes - one for first-party requests and one for third-party requests
-. is a possibility, but it would lessen the chance for future confusion if only
one statute occupied the field. In this way, Congress could insure, with the
exception of a differing standard for privacy, that requests were treated the
same whether they sought a requester's own 'ecords or the records of another.
Such an integrated statute, furthermore, could set up one set of reasonable
time limits and procedures. Finally, one approach concerning entire record-system
exemptions or individual document exemptions would apply.
As a matter of practical effect, such an integrated statute would probably
resemble the policy now being followed by the Department of Justice, but the
fact that one agency has been able to create regulations which make the FOIA
and the Privacy Act easier to apply is not a satisfactory way of resolving the
problem. While it may be impossible to create legislative standards which can
forecast whether a release will constitute an invasion of privacy, it is possible
and necessary to insure that individuals get the same treatment, protections
and information no matter which method of access they choose.

